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Abstract   The concept of well being has become the main criterion to assess 
quality of life in contemporary society. Individual well–being describes the 
individual quality of life, while social well–being refers to quality of life in a 
society. Given that well–being has a multitude of dimensions, a unique defini-
tion of it is elusive to scholars. In this article social well–being is conceptu-
alised as a dynamic process within the context set by social integration as 
one’s relationship to society and the community. This includes the quality of 
interaction between the individual and society and one’s ‘social actualisation’ 
understood as the realisattion of one’s social capacities. Social actualisation 
also involves one’s ability to  influence social processes and to benefit from 
social cohesion, which consists, in any society, of the quality, organisation 
and functioning of the social world. Hence the ability to impact society is an 
integral part of individual well being. This paper suggests that philosophical 
practice as a new paradigm in the humanities holds out promise for the im-
provement of both individual and social well–being.
Key words: well–being, quality of life, concept, capabilities, experience, philo-
sophical practice.
The aim of this article is to point toward a novel perspective of social 
transformation by inquiring into the nature of well–being. I suggest here 
a re–setting of the traditional intervention horizon of the helping profes-
sions with regard to well–being through philosophical practice as a cul-
tivating methodology. When it is seen in this reformatory way, philo-
sophical practice can be understood as sustainably enhancing individual 
and social well–being.1 
The theoretical perspective used in the article for the the conceptualisa-
tion of well-being is embedded in the tradition of the social construction-
ism. This particular theoretical approach describes social reality as the 
interplay between social actors and their historical and cultural contexts. 
More specifically, social constructionism implies that well–being is a 
product of the specific overall context of one’s life. Such a perspective 
supports the understanding of well–being which arises from an apprais-
al of one’s circumstances and one’s ability to productively functioning in 
1  This article was written in the course of research conducted within the framework 
of the project “Crime in Serbia: Phenomenology, Risks and Possibilities for Social 
Intervention” (No. 47011),  which is implemented at Institute for Criminological and 
Sociological Research, Belgrade. The project is funded by the Serbian Ministry of Edu-
cation, Science and Technological Development.
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society (Sen, Nussbaum 1993). Well–being provides a person with a sense 
of how their life is unfolding in light of one’s circumstances, activities 
and ‘mental capital’ (psychological resources). 
The concept of well–being and related notions 
In public policy studies, the shift towards accountability–based public 
policy, which is based on reliable information and requires accurate mea-
surements of the outcomes of policies, has caused well–being to increas-
ingly become a major concern in public policy planning. At the same time 
improvement in the quality of both individual and social life started to 
be seen as the ultimate aim of public policy. In recent years, the collection 
of relevant statistical data used for the measurement of effects of public 
policies has become transformed into a complex system of indicators. 
Notably, several European governments and institutions have recently 
developed new statistical measures of progress that include indicators 
of well–being, following the already established monitoring systems for 
well–being established by the OECD, the UN Canada and the USA 
(Chapple, 2010; Dolan, Metcalfe 2011)2. A growing body of research into 
what contributes to the quality of people’s experiences of their lives provide 
social context to well–being and supports understanding of the factors 
that both influence and constitute well–being as the ultimate motivation 
behind a person’s actions (Quick, Seaford, internet; Dolan, Metcalfe 2011; 
Helliwell, Barrington–Leigh, Harris Huang 2010; Manderson 2005; Hup-
pert, Baylis, Keverne 2005; Helliwell, Putnam, internet). Individuals are 
embedded in social structures and face myriad of social tasks and chal-
lenges. It is impossible to explain social transformations without linking 
them to personal hopes and aspirations. 
Subjective well–being, which primarily pertains to an individual, is usu-
ally seen as a psychological construct which arises from the way in which 
people experience the quality of their lives. It consists of a person’s cog-
nitive and affective evaluations of their life. These evaluations rest on 
emotional reactions to events as well as on cognitive judgments of satis-
faction and fulfillment (McGillivray, Clarke 2006: 4). Thus, subjective 
2  New statistical data–collection relevant for well–being has been initiated by the 
European Commission and the Italian Council for Economics and Labour in 2013, the 
German Council of Economic Experts and the French Council for Economic Analyses 
in 2010, and by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2011. 
In 2013 the Unites Nations introduced the International Day of Happiness with a view 
of acknowledging that in order to attain global happiness, economic development 
must be accompanied by social and environmental well being.
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well–being is a broad concept that includes experiencing pleasant emo-
tions, low levels of negative moods, and a generally high level of satis-
faction with life. In order to achieve a subjective well–being one needs 
an individual vitality to undertake activities which are meaningful, en-
gaging, and make one feel competent and autonomous. It also requires 
a stock of inner resources to make one resilient to changes beyond one’s 
immediate control. Finally, subjective well–being requires one to have a 
sense of relatedness to other people, a sense of availability of supportive 
relationships and dynamic connections with others (Huppert, Baylis, 
Keverne 2013; Andrews, Withey 1976). 
Severine Deneulin and Alister McGregor argue that “it is necessary to 
take account of (…) ‘living well together’, expanding the social conditions 
in which it is possible for people to live well in relation to others in soci-
ety. Our struggles to live well take place within the inter-subjective space 
of human relationships” (Deneulin, McGregor, 2010). The term ‘living 
well together’, which is derived from Paul Ricoeur’s ‘structures of living 
together’ seeks to encapsulate the reality that the individual and social 
projects of living well co–constitute each other (Ricoeur, 1992). This sug-
gests a dynamic conception of the relationship between ‘the individual’ 
and ‘the community’ and indicates that the term ‘community’ in itself 
does not adequately capture the usually contested and conflicted inter-
play between the different individual projects of ‘living well’. On the 
other hand, Corey Keyes insists that a degree of social equality despite 
the competition of individual life plans is also necessary for a sustained 
sense of personal well–being in society (Keyes 1998). The need for social 
recognition and inclusion as a vital part of individual well–being was ex-
perimentally tested by the method called ‘functional magnetic resonance 
imaging’ (FMRI), which has shown that the emotional region of the brain 
that is activated when we experience rejection is in fact, the same region 
(dorsal anterior cingulate) which registers emotional responses to physical 
pain (Cacioppo, Patrick 2008). The desire for social connection has thus 
been classified as a human need in psychology, and described as “the 
need to belong” (Baumeister, Leary 1995). Conversely, social exclusion 
obviously thwarts the need to belong and militates in principle against 
the possibility of social acceptance (Diener, Diener, Diener 1995). This 
makes the concept of well–beings in its individual and its social guise 
almost identical from a functional point of view.
Social acceptance is a key element of well–being because it helps cater 
for the needs whose satisfaction is instrumental to the achievement of 
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well-being. Individuals who illustrate social acceptance trust others, 
think that others are capable of kindness, and believe that people can be 
industrious. Socially accepting people hold favorable views of human 
nature and feel comfortable with other (Wrightsman 1991). Such people 
are likely to experience greater personal well–being than others and are 
likely to be instrumental to the achievement of social well–being from 
which both they and others benefit. 
Socially accepting members of society also contribute to everyone’s sense 
of ‘social contribution’—another concept deemed relevant to individual 
well–being. In this context one’s social contribution is the evaluation of 
one’s social value as it includes the belief that one is a vital member of 
society, with something of value to give to the world. Social contribution 
reflects whether and to what degree people feel that whatever they do in 
the world is valued by the society and contributes to public welfare. For 
Joachim Israel, this construct is consistent Karl Marx’s idea that people 
are naturally productive Thus social alienation is a counterpart to the 
diminution of the perceived value of one’s life and everyday activities. 
(Israel 1971). All of these concepts, when they become experience, con-
tribute to a sense of self–actualisation in society, in including a sense of 
achievement of “the meaning of life” (Maslow 1987). 
The capabilities approach 
as a theoretical context for well–being
On a basic level, the capability theory suggests that achieving well–being 
is a matter of “freedom to do and be”, thus predicating well–being on a 
sense of agency and ownership of one’s own choices. The agency and the 
sense of empowerment arising from agency thus represent the relevant 
“capability” to achieve well–being. Very simply put, the requisite norma-
tive exercises for the adequate projection of capabilities in order to 
achieve well being naturally involve at least the following:  (1) assessment 
of individual well–being; (2) evaluation and assessment of social arrange-
ments; and (3) design of policies and proposals aiming at social change. 
In all these normative exercises, the capability approach prioritizes cer-
tain opportunities for individuals in society (such as their genuine op-
portunities to receive education, their ability to move around or to enjoy 
supportive social relationships). In the more narrow way, the capability 
approach tells us what information we should look at if we are to judge 
how well someone’s life is going or has gone; this kind of information is 
needed in any account of well–being or human development. Since the 
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capability approach contends that the relevant kind of information con-
cerns human functioning and the opportunities to achieve those such 
functioning, it also partially provides for interpersonal comparisons of 
well–being (Robeyns, internet). 
In the context of achievement of well–being, capabilities manifest them-
selves in daily life as the person’s real freedoms or opportunities to 
achieve increased levels of personal and social “functionality”, and indi-
rectly social self–actualization. Thus, while travelling is a form of social 
functioning, the real opportunity to travel is the corresponding capability. 
The distinction between functioning and capability is between the realized 
and the possible in the social world; in other words, it is the distinction 
between achievements, on the one hand, and freedoms or valuable oppor-
tunities from which one can choose, on the other.
According to the Amartya Sen (deem a founder of the capabilities theory), 
the concepts of functioning and capability are the best metric for most 
kinds of interpersonal evaluations (Sen 1985). In other words, interper-
sonal evaluations should be conceptualized in terms of people’s capabili-
ties to function, that is, their effective opportunities to undertake actions 
and activities that they have reason to value, and their effective opportuni-
ties to be the person that they have reason to wish to be. All such func-
tional capacities and active realizations together constitute what makes a 
life valuable. Whereas functioning is a proposed conceptualization for 
interpersonal comparisons of (achieved) well–being, capability is the con-
ceptualization for interpersonal comparisons of freedom to pursue one’s 
well–being. Sen calls this freedom “the well–being freedom” (Sen 1985:169).
On a political level, Sen’s well–being freedom results in the qualities of 
social system described as justice and development, both of which, accord-
ing to him, should be conceptualized in terms of people’s capabilities. 
However, there is a more complex level of calculation which is required 
to measure social well–being accurately. What matters are not only the 
individual opportunities that are open to a particular person at a par-
ticular time, hence “capabilities” in a piecemeal way, but rather the com-
binations or sets of opportunities which constitute a consolidated pros-
pect for the realization of a strategy of the good life.  Thus, in a “happy” 
society, a maximum number of maximally encouraging combinations of 
opportunities are available to people to pursue their choices which are 
related directly to their personal well–being. In an ideal case, the exis-
tence of such social opportunities for the personal pursuit of well–being 
engenders social well–being as well. 
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Ingrid Robeyns provides an illustrative example of a low–skilled, poor 
single parent, who lives in a society without decent social provisions. This 
person is supposed to acquire and hold a job, which require them to 
spend many hours working and commuting to and from the workplace, 
but will generate the income needed to properly feed the person and her 
family. Additionally, the person is expected to achieve the function of 
caring for the children at home and giving them all the necessary atten-
tion, care and supervision in order for them to flourish as human beings 
and healthy and productive members of society. In a piecemeal analysis, 
both functions arise from the respective opportunities which are open 
to the single parent, but according to Robeyns they are not both open at 
the same time. For both capabilities to be effectively available to the 
person the society would need to provide adequate social assistance in a 
fashion sufficiently coordinated and “user-friendly” in order to allow the 
single parent to both work productively and take care of her children 
adequately. For example, this could involve the availability of high–quality 
child–care at the work place or opportunities for work from home which 
is compensated in the same way as work at the workplace. Both options 
are typically offered to single parents in societies with the highest level 
of social provision. Thus, while a society with a low level of social provi-
sion does appear to offer both the opportunity to work and, in abstract, 
the opportunity to raise one’s children adequately (e.g. it is a relatively 
safe society with a relatively low unemployment rate), unless it offers these 
capabilities in a coordinated fashion, as a combination of opportunities, 
only one of the capabilities can be utilized and result in adequate social 
functioning (Robeyns 2005: 93).
The capability approach explicitly endorses and relies upon a key dis-
tinction instrumental for the achievement of social well–being, namely 
the means–ends distinction. The approach stresses the need for clarity 
on whether something is valued as an end in itself or as a means to a 
valuable end. For the capability approach, the ultimate ends of interper-
sonal comparisons are people’s capabilities. This implies that the capabil-
ity approach evaluates public policies according to their impact on peo-
ple’s capabilities as well as their actual functioning in society. There is an 
interesting consequence here: when evaluating a social system, the ca-
pability approach does not tend to let the estimate be slanted by exam-
ples of exceptional functionality in the face of debilitating capabilities, 
which is characteristic in the individualistic cultures that value “heroism”. 
In the context of the capability theory exceptional functioning against 
militating odds tells us little about the quality of the system and the range 
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of coordinated chances that it offers to its constituents as genuine pros-
pects of self–actualization. The fact that somebody in a particular society 
might be able to become a top student by bearing extreme sacrifices 
arising from the lack of social support structure does not show that it is 
an acceptable system: only a coordinated spectrum of opportunities does 
which systematically leads to optimum self–actualization through social 
functionality does. The theory does not ask whether a particular popula-
tion is relatively healthy (it could be healthy because it has adapted to 
relatively poor health provision, e.g. by developing immunities to infec-
tions after initially suffering a high level of deaths from these infections). 
Instead the theory asks whether the means or resources necessary for 
good public health are available in a sufficiently broad and effective set 
of combinations, such as clean water, adequate sanitation, access to doc-
tors, public education on the prevention of various diseases, etc. The 
theory asks whether people are well-nourished, and whether the means 
or conditions for good nourishment, such as a sufficient food supply and 
adequate distributive entitlements to food are guaranteed as a matter of 
public policy. Likewise, the theory asks whether people have access to a 
high–quality education system, to a real political participation, and to 
supportive communal activities that enable them to cope with struggles 
in daily life and foster caring mutual relationships in the community.
However, the measurements of well–being within the context of the ca-
pabilities approach tend to focus on ends rather than the means, within 
limits. The main theoretical reason for this orientation in measurements 
is that people tend to differ in their abilities to convert means into valu-
able opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functioning). Since ends 
are what ultimately matters when thinking about well–being and the 
quality of life, means can only work as reliable proxies of people’s op-
portunities to achieve those ends if they all have the same capacities or 
powers to convert those means into equal capability sets. Just as the ex-
istence of a single high–level scholar in a society which does not provide 
adequate support to learning does not tell us that this system is still 
adequate, so the existence of certain opportunities which do not translate 
into ends (e.g. the existence of many schools and a free education which 
yields a semi–literate population) does not mean that the level of well–
being in the society is high. Such discrepancies between a high level of 
means and a low level of achieved ends falls within the category of what 
the capabilities theory calls adverse ‘conversion factors’: despite a favor-
able policy focusing on means, the ability of the people to convert such 
concrete means into real life opportunities or capabilities and turn them 
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into high functionality is low, thus the level of well–being in the society 
is lower than would be expected judged by the means only.
This is problem well illustrated in some parts of the world. Food may be 
abundant in a village, but a starving person may have nothing to ex-
change for it or no legal claim on it. A society might be wealthy, but the 
wealth could be concentrated in the hands of only the top 10% of the 
population, and the remaining 90% might live in utter poverty because 
the systems of distributive justice are not sufficiently egalitarian and 
access to social goods is cut for most. Similarly, a country might be rich 
in oil but its citizens could starve because oil is used by corrupt political 
elites to foster delusional foreign policy aims, pay a foreign debt ahead 
of time or inflate the defense budget in an attempt to assert national 
military power. In all these cases, the means, strictly speaking, exist, but 
this means little for the well–being of the citizens.
The capability theory’s preference for a normative analysis of ends rather 
than the means has at least two additional advantages apart from its ca-
pacity to account for inter–individual differences. First, in light of the 
priority of the evaluation of the ends, the concomitant evaluation of the 
means is cast in an instrumental context for the achievement of the 
means, rather that assuming the status of an “intrinsic evaluation”. This 
is in many cases consistent with our basic moral intuitions: for example, if 
the ends are the primary yardstick by which to measure social well–being, 
then money or economic growth will not be valued for their own sake, 
but only in so far as they contribute to the expansion of people’s capa-
bilities. Secondly, by measuring well–being primarily by the achievement 
of ends, one does not a priori assume that there is only one overridingly 
important means to that end (such as income as a means for material 
well–being as an end). Rather one can measure well–being by ends, while 
leaving it open for discussion which types of means are important for the 
fostering and nurturing of a particular capability, or set of capabilities, 
that are, in turn, requisite for the achievement of that particular end. For 
some capabilities, the most important means will indeed be financial 
resources and economic production, but for others it may be particular 
political practices and institutions. In the case of material well–being, 
income is surely an important means, however in the absence of comple-
mentary means, such as fair taxation, reasonable prices, and a sustain-
able system of distribution of financial burdens between members of 
the society, even a high impact might translate into sub–optimal material 
existence, thus failing to result in material well–being. Conversely, even 
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a comparably low income might result in quite a decent material well–being 
if one lives in a social system which provides education, health–care, social 
services free of charge and, for example, the income taxes are low. In some 
oil–producing countries today there is no income tax and health care and 
education are free. In such systems, assuming that there is a reasonable 
pricing policy, people might be expected to possess a relatively high level 
of material well–being even if they had lower incomes than those living 
in the contemporary liberal societies where all of these things are charged 
for and taxes are high. In other cases, people’s general well–being in very 
wealthy societies  might be fundamentally predicated upon a variety of 
mutually complementary public policies, such as fighting a homophobic, 
ethno–phobic, racist or sexist social climate (Robeyns 2005). Thus the 
analysis of the means that translate into capabilities should be left for 
discussion wherever possible rather than being immediately prejudiced 
by a measurement of well–being based on means only. The capabilities 
theory achieves this advantage.
Finally, the coversion factors themselves need to be differentiated by 
type. Amartya Sen and scholars influenced by his writings (e.g. Peter 
Vallentyne, Vivian Walsh, Frances Stewart) point out that conversion 
factors tend to be categorized into at least three distinct groups (Robeyns 
2005: 99). All conversion factors basically describe how a person can, or 
is free to, convert the available resources into a functioning, yet the sources 
of the conversion factors may differ. 
Personal conversion factors are internal to the person: they include things 
such as a metabolism, physical condition, sex, reading skills, or intelli-
gence. If a person is disabled, she is in a bad physical condition, or has 
never learned to cycle, then a bicycle (a resource) will be of limited value 
for her to convert it into a capacity for the achievement of the end of 
personal mobility.  
Social conversion factors are embedded in the social system in which one 
lives. They include things such as public policies, social norms, practices 
of fair or unfair discrimination, societal hierarchies, or power relations 
related to class, gender, race, or caste. 
The environmental conversion factors emerge from the physical or built 
environment. They include things such as climate, pollution, the prone-
ness to earthquakes, and the presence or absence of seas and oceans. 
Among aspects of the built environment are the stability of buildings, 
roads, and bridges, and the means of transportation and communication. 
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Take the example of a bicycle. How much a bicycle contributes to a per-
son’s mobility depends on that person’s physical condition (a personal 
conversion factor), the social mores including whether in a particular 
society, for example, women are allowed or socially encouraged to ride a 
bicycle (a social conversion factor), and the availability of bike paths so 
that riding a bike is not a serious risk to life and limb (an environmental 
conversion factor).
The three types of conversion factors all stress that it is simply not suf-
ficient to know the resources a person owns or has access to in order to 
be able to assess capacity to achieve well–being; instead one needs to 
know much more about the person and her circumstances. Sen does not 
use the concept of “capability” to refer exclusively to a person’s abilities 
or other internal powers, but rather to opportunities which are made 
feasible, and are at the same time necessarily constrained by, both inter-
nal (personal) and external (social and environmental) conversion factors 
(Robeyns, internet; Canevello, Crocker 2010).
Philosophical practice 
as a tool to enhance well–being
To complete the picture of the capability’s theory as a context for the 
perception of well–being, Martha Nussbaum builds upon the capabil-
ity approach’s attempt to sketch the needs that must be met in order 
for a person to be fully empowered (Nussbaum 2004).  Nussbaum high-
lights empathy as an essential ingredient of humanity. In her work on 
disgust, shame and dignity, she dismantles the concept of disgust to 
highlight the necessity of empathy for social justice, and shows how 
constructs of disgust have been deployed to deny the full humanity 
of marginalized people. For example, she explains how constructing 
taboos around issues such as menstruation and the policing of rigid 
frameworks of sexuality have limited the scope of who is considered 
worthy of a humane and dignified treatment. To address such de–hu-
manizing consequences, empathy allows us, in a relevant moral and 
emotional sense, to become “other–to–ourselves”. By identifying with 
others, however fleetingly or partially, we shift the grounds on which our 
own self rests (Manderson 2005). A space opens up for ethical imagina-
tion, for creating a difference in relation to ourselves which gives us the 
potential to imagine new possibilities for self–other relations. Such 
imagination encourages the empathizing person to actively and collab-
oratively share a world with others. 
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According to Nussbaum, those whom we “dehumanize” and “otherize” are 
outside of our circle of empathy, beyond the realm of concern of the state 
or society (Nussbaum 2013). The development of empathetic mutual un-
derstanding features as essential to both individual and social well–being, 
because it facilitates the development of an ability to identify with others 
and understand another person’s situation and feelings. Such understand-
ing, in turn, enables us to establish rapport and build a basis for trustwor-
thy communication within the community. The achievement of our per-
sonal well–being, after all, is only possible if we ask ourselves why we wish 
to engage in a particular activity, whose needs will be met by our engage-
ment, and what the potential consequences (both positive and negative 
are) of our engagement are likely (Griffiths1985). When empathy is added 
to these considerations, we are able not just to assess whether a particular 
activity would contribute to our own well–being, but also whether it will 
cater to someone else’s needs as well and whether and how far it is likely 
to contribute to someone else’s well–being, in addition to our own. The 
satisfaction that arises from such multiply beneficial choices for the well–
being of ourselves and others, in turn, is likely to additionally increase our 
own personal well–being, as well as contributing to the development of a 
caring and socially constructive character traits in ourselves as the agent. 
Philosophical practice potentially plays a key role in facilitating the de-
velopment of empathetic dispositions and in the cultivation of sensibilities 
that lead to the development of particular socially desirable character–
traits. Thus philosophical practice could be seen as a crucial method of 
facilitating both personal and social learning which is geared to the 
achievement of well–being on any level.
Very generally speaking, by the use of different philosophical methods, 
philosophical practice aims to clarify, articulate, explore and comprehend 
philosophical aspects of  belief–systems or world–views. Activities com-
mon to philosophical practice include: the examination of  arguments 
and justifications, clarification, analysis, and definition of important 
terms and concepts, exposure and examination of underlying assump-
tions and logical implications, exposure of conflicts and inconsistencies, 
exploration of traditional philosophical theories and their significance 
for concrete issues and all other related activities that have historically 
been identified as philosophical (Hamlyn 1992; Dewey 1991). 
It is common to philosophical practitioners to use a multitude of ideas 
and methodologies within the philosophical lore and turn them into 
a highly adaptable set of tools (explanation, criticism, direction, and 
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imagination) which the philosophical practitioners used in consultancy, 
counseling or training with a variety of practical goals in mind.
Perhaps the greatest role for philosophical practice in fostering indi-
vidual and social well–being lies in two places, pertaining respective to 
the individual and collective plane of consideration. On an individual 
level, the most obvious aim of philosophical practice arises from the 
ancient mission of philosophy as a whole, which, arguably, was to con-
tribute to the achievement of “the good life”. The idea of “the good life” 
was a complex one, consisting of a variety of qualities (the capacities 
theory would say: a variety of functionalities), which make life worth-
while, enjoyable and socially respectable. Thus the good life, in this 
context, involves what the capacity theory conceptualizes as the achieve-
ment of personal ends and the ability to achieve personal flourishing 
which is followed by a sense of satisfaction, control and ownership of 
one’s actions, choices and, to some extent, their outcomes. The achieve-
ment of this goal, for each person, may require the assistance of some-
one else, preferably a philosopher. At times of existential crises a certain 
“narrowing”, even a “darkening” of personal perspective tends to occur, 
which it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a person to accurately 
view a way out of the perceptual, conceptual and emotional impasse by 
themselves. This is where philosophical practice offers practical assis-
tance which allows the wealth of philosophical ideas, joined to the 
philosophical practitioner’s keen perception, to be at work in solving 
real problem and providing well–founded guidance towards the good 
life. While the good life might differ from one person to another, argu-
ably the way to it requires a degree of practical wisdom and reliance on 
the intellectual and existential experiences of others if it is to be as direct 
and as rewarding as possible. In this process, importantly, all of the 
concepts pertaining to the capacity theory are readily employable in a 
practical process of philosophical consultancy, with the express aim of 
improving one’s overall existential well–being. Thus philosophical prac-
tice is a form of putting philosophy to work in the service of the achieve-
ment of generalized well–being, in much the same way as the capacities 
theory sees the ultimate ethical goal of life and personal development 
in the achievement of increased functionality, which, in turn, leads to 
increased satisfaction with life. 
On a social level, the various modalities of philosophical practice highlight 
its potential for social intervention. The philosophical practitioner will 
work with groups, companies or institutions not just to increase the group’s 
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or institution’s ability to achieve their formally proclaimed aims (though 
this too is an integral part of philosophical practice as corporate or in-
stitutional consultancy), but will also seek to identify and address any 
structural and dynamic issues within the group of institution that block 
the way to the achievement of a greater amount of collective well–being.
On a political level, philosophical practice deals with the inter–relation 
between social well–being and individual well-being in two directions. 
First, it addresses the way in which an increased individual contribution 
to collective well–being might increase individual satisfaction, thus lead-
ing to a transformation of political subjects to full–fledged political con-
stituents in a strong functionalist sense, as agents behind the commu-
nity’s actions. In this context, philosophical practice addresses issues of 
empathy, solidarity and trust between members of a political commu-
nity as the pre–requisites for the solidification of inter–personal bonds 
that the community, or the political system, themselves bestow upon 
their members or constituents. Thus philosophical practice is able to 
increase the ability of a political community to foster opportunities (or 
“capacities”) for all its members in systematic yet very concrete ways, by 
addressing specific issues at the interface of personal, existential experi-
ence on the one hand, and social policy concerns, on the other. This the 
philosophical practitioner seeks to achieve in its consultancy role for the 
political institutions, on the one hand, and for grass–roots representative 
organisations (NGOs, ideally the political parties, or informal groups 
initiatives), on the other. 
At the same time, philosophical practice holds potential to effectively 
address concerns arising from problems described as “conversion factors” 
by the proponents of the capability theory. The failings or “misfiring” of 
conversion of socially provided means to individually useful capacities 
to produce personally significant functionalities, to use the terminology 
of the capacity approach, are ideal material for practical philosophical 
work. These failures may arise from misconceptions about the instru-
mental value of the means, the nature and extent of the individual en-
titlements to such needs, or the significance of the capacities and the 
competencies required to turn such capacities into functionalities for 
one’s individual and one’s community’s social well–being. Such value 
questions are readily dealt with by philosophical practice when they are 
placed in concrete contexts where they can be considered not theoreti-
cally (this is the job of theoretical philosophy), but in light of their exis-
tential significance for the person and the community; thus not merely 
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rationally, but in their full experiential reach both for the person and for 
the collective. Thus philosophical practice indeed appears to be is the 
tool of choice for social intervention when well–being is seen as the main 
concern. (Elias 1982). Given its direct orientation to the achievement of 
well-being in terms of aiming to help increase the quality of life, philo-
sophical practice allows an approach that is measurable along the lines 
consistent with those proposed by the capabilities theory. While the 
basic focus of the measurement (or assessment) is on the results, func-
tionalities, or ends, the critical consideration of these ends, which is 
fundamental to philosophy and philosophical practice as one of its faces, 
opens ample room for the consideration of the multiplicity of issues of 
sequencing and combinations of opportunities, as well as the nature and 
variety of conversion factors that determine the extent to which the good 
life, or well–being, will be achieved in any particular case. Thus it appears 
that philosophical practice is the natural complementary “twin” of the 
capabilities theory when both are perceived in the context of the practi-
cal concern of the achievement of well–being, whether on an individual 
or on a social level.
Primljeno: 5. septembra 2014
Prihvaćeno: 11. decembra 2014
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Aleksandra Bulatović
Blagostanje, sposobnosti i filozofska praksa
Sažetak
Koncept blagostanja je u savremenom društvu postao ključni element razma-
tranja kvaliteta života. O kvalitetu života pojedinca govori se u kontekstu 
in dividualnog blagostanja, a pojmom društvenog blagostanja kolokvijal no 
se označava kvalitet života u zajedinici. Kako blagostanje ima brojne aspekte, 
teoretičarima izmiče jedinstvena definicija. U ovom tekstu se društveno bla-
gostanje konceptualizuje kao dinamičan proces u dimenzijama društvene 
inte gracije, odnosa pojedinca i društva, individualnog samoostvarenja u 
okvi rima potencijala za društveni napredak, mogućnosti pojedinca da utiče 
na društvene procese i društvene kohezije kao faktora značajnog za postiza-
nje individualnog blagostanja. Kako su ovo aspekti društvenog života koji 
pred stavljaju zbir pojedinačnih, individualnih stavova, aktivnosti, osećanja 
i osećaja, pomenuta konceptualizacija upućuje na direktnu vezu između 
dru štvenog i individualnog blagostanja koja funkcioniše slično sistemu spo-
je nih sudova, jer se promene na jednom nivou reflektuju na drugom, težeći 
za ravnotežom među tim nivoima. 
Frazom „savremena filozofska praksa” u akademskom diskursu se označava 
kritičko promišljanje kao sredstvo prevazilaženja postojećih misaonih obra-
zaca i praktični filozofski rad na rešavanju problema koji narušavaju kvalitet 
ži vota. Autorka razmatra filozofsku praksu kao korisno sredstvo za uvećanje 
do brobiti gradeći argumentaciju na normativističkom teorijskom pristupu 
za snovanom na sposobnostima (the capabilities approach) koji fokusira oce-
nji vanje i vrednovanje individualnog blagostanja, društvenog sistema i kre-
i ranja javne politike.
Ključne reči: blagostanje, kvalitet života, teorija sposobnosti, iskustvo, filo-
zofska praksa
